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INTRODUCTION

T

he purpose of this Article is to offer a positive analysis' of the
common law of corporate managers' 2 fiduciary duties. The

Some of the most noteworthy positive analyses done in recent years have
been a result of the law and economics movements, where commentators, such
as Judge Richard Posner, have written extensively attempting to demonstrate, for
example, that the common law is compatible with a pursuit of economic
efficiency, as that term is defined by them. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992). Posner defines economic

efficiency as a pattern of resource allocation in which resources are distributed
according to one's willingness and ability to pay the most for the particular
resource. Id. at 11-15. For a discussion of other definitions of economic
efficiency, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization,
8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509, 512 (1980).
2 In this Article, the term "managers" includes corporate officers and
directors but excludes corporate owners. The author realizes that some cases
make distinctions between the fiduciary duties of officers and directors. For
example, in the classic old case of Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920), bank
directors, but not the president, escaped liability for the actions of an employee
who literally stole all the assets of the bank. Nonetheless, the basic principles
applied to actions by officers and directors are the same, and thus the two groups
are treated as one.
Also, owners (i.e., stockholders) are involved in certain corporate "management" decisions, such as voting to approve a merger, and, accordingly, they
have been subjected to scrutiny under fiduciary principles. See, e.g., Swinney
v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd,480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.
1973) (imposing fiduciary duty on majority stockholder selling majority block
of voting stock); Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (imposing
fiduciary duty on majority stockholder voting on affiliated merger). Out of
practical necessity, however, the discussion in this Article is limited to
fiduciary duties as applied to "managers," although much of what is proposed
in this piece seems applicable to stockholders' management decisions, especially when the decisions are undertaken by a majority or controlling stockholder.
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Article attempts to explain3 the present shape of these corporate fiduciary
duties by reference to Pareto criteria.4
A particular state of affairs ("state B") is considered to be Pareto
superior to another state of affairs ("state A") if at least one person in
state B is better off than he or she is in state A and no one in state B is
worse off than he or she is in state A. Since in a move from state A to
state B, no one loses and at least one person gains, state B is considered
superior to state A. Any state is Pareto efficient if no further move to a
Pareto superior state is possible.
This Article proposes that corporate managers' fiduciary duties as
developed through the common law are best understood as mandates from
courts for corporate managers to take all actions that move corporate
shareholders to Pareto superior states. This Article suggests that such an
analysis enables one to discover a general consistency in the spate of
seemingly confusing cases interpreting managers' fiduciary duties in such
diverse matters as lock-ups,5 managers' freedom (or perhaps obligation)

' Since this piece is intended as a positive article, it does not treat in any
detail the moral justification for the. underlying principles utilized in explaining
the common law of corporate fiduciary duties. In another recent piece, the author
deals extensively with such normative matters in regard to corporate fiduciary
duties. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., CorporateFiduciaryPrinciplesfor the
Post-ContractarianEra, 23 FLA. ST. 1W.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter
Campbell, CorporateFiduciaryPrinciples].
4 For a clear and compact explapation of Pareto criteria, see JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY & JULEs L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 182-85 (1990). For a
more extensive discussion of Pareto criteria, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Exchange, and the Auction: PhilosophicAspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CAL. L. REv. 221 (1980).
' Over the years, courts have faced questions involving various provisions that are designed in greatly varying degrees to "lock up" an acquisition on
behalf of a favored suitor. The lock-up techniques vary from the exceedingly
mild versions, such as provisions merely obligating the board of the target to
recommend a merger to the target's stockholders, see, e.g., Jewel Cos. v. Pay
Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984); Belden Corp.
v. InterNorth, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 98 (Ill.App. Ct. 1980); ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill,
Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1986), through the perhaps somewhat stronger
versions, such as agreements that the target's board will use its best efforts to
complete the acquisition by the favored suitor, see, e.g., Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less
Drug Stores Northwest, inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984); Great Western
Producers Co-Operative v. Great Western United Corp., 613 P.2d 873 (Colo.
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to promote the interests of constituencies other than stockholders,6

1980); ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1986); Texaco, Inc.
v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (implying a best efforts
obligation on behalf of the target board), and agreements under which the
target's board grants a cancellation fee to a favored suitor, in the event the
favored suitor is outbid for the target, see, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp.,
798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,
781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). Finally, the strong versions of lock-ups
include asset options and stock options granted to the favored suitor by the
target, see, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264
(2d Cir. 1986); Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d
34 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986).
6 A rich body of literature exists on the appropriateness of extending
the
fiduciary duties of corporate managers to protect constituencies other than
stockholders. Principally the literature deals with the questions of what, if any,
duties managers now have or should have to promote the interests of corporate
creditors and employees. With regard to creditors, see Albert H. Barkey, The
FinancialArticulationofa FiduciaryDuty to Bondholderswith FiduciaryDuties
to Stockholders of the Corporation,20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 47, 67-72 (1986);
William W. Bratton, Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships:Legal Theory in a Time
ofRestructuring,1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 106-13; RuthefordB Campbell, Jr., Limited
Liabilityfor CorporateShareholder:Myth orMatter-of-Fact,63 KY. L.J. 23, 5571 (1975-76) [hereinafter Campbell, Limited Liability]; Morey W. McDaniel,
Bondholders and CorporateGovernance,41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986) [hereinafter
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance]; Morey W. McDaniel,
BondholdersandStockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205 (1988) [hereinafterMcDaniel,
Bondholders and Stockholders]; Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The
Corporation, the Bondholder and FiduciaryDuties, 10 J. L. & CoMM. 187
(1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The FairnessRights of CorporateBondholders,
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1990). Regarding obligations of corporate managers
to employees, see Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuringthe Corporation'sNexus
of Contracts:Recognizing a FiduciaryDuty to ProtectDisplaced Workers, 69
N.C. L. REv. 1189 (1991); Katherine V. Stone, Employees asStakeholdersunder
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45, 48-53
(1991); Katherine V. Stone, PolicingEmployment Contractswith the Nexus-ofContracts Firm, 43 TORONTO L.J. 353, 363-69 (1993). For a completely
different view of employees and their need for fiduciary protection, see
Richard Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947,
953-55 (1984).
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freeze-outs,7 and the meaning and applicability of the so called Revlon
duties.8

' The following is representative of the more significant articles written on
freezeouts and other similar transactions in which stockholders have been
subjected to varying degrees of economic and strategic pressure to give up their
equity interests in a company in exchange for cash: Victor Brudney & Marvin

A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354

(1978) [hereinafter Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement]; Edward F. Greene,
CorporateFreeze-outMergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 487
(1976); Thomas L. Hazen, ManagementBuyouts and GovernanceParadigms,25

WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1990); Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out
Mergers:A HistoricalPerspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 624 (1981). The most

significant cases in the area deal with the subject of whether or not a valid
business purpose is required in a freezeout. This issue is discussed infra notes 6788 and accompanyingtext, and is displayed in its most intriguing form by tracing
the Delaware cases on the matter beginning with Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) and ending with Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
s As is described more fully infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text, the
Delaware Supreme Court held in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), that when it became apparent in a
takeover battle that the target would be broken up, the duty of the target's board
"changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company." Id. at 182.
Not surprisingly, this holding generated subsequent litigation dealing with such
matters as when these so called "Revlon duties" attach. See, e.g., Paramount
Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). For the meaning
of the obligation to auction, see, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 37 (1990); Janet
E. Kerr, Delaware Goes Shoppingfor a "New" Interpretation of the Revlon
Standard: The Effect of the QVC Decision on Strategic Mergers, 58 ALB. L.

REV. 609 (1995); Stephen P. Lamb & Andrew J. Turezyn, Revlon and Hanson
Trust: Unlocking the Lock-ups, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 497 (1987); Kenneth J.
Nechbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings, Inc. - The Requirements of a Level PlayingField in ContestedMergers andIts Effect on Lock-ups
and Other Bidding Deterrents,12 DEL. J. CoRe. L. 473 (1987); Paul L. Regan,
The UnimportanceofBeingEarnest:ParamountRewritesthe RulesforEnhanced
Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 125 (1994); E. Ashton
Johnston, Note, Defenders of the Corporate Bastion in the Revlon Zone:

Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 40 CATH.U. L. REV. 155 (1990);
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The Article offers not only explanations of the major cases in the area
of corporate fiduciary duties but also examples of cases in which courts
have varied from the requirement that managers pursue Pareto superior
states. Such deviations have wrought confusion and problematic
outcomes. Accordingly, in connection with the positive analysis, this
Article at times offers prescriptions for rules of law that are inconsistent
with managers' obligations to pursue Pareto superiority on behalf of
corporate stockholders.
While all of this admittedly sounds esoteric, in fact the analysis is
intended to be intensely practical by providing courts and corporate
planners with clear principles that can be applied in a fashion that
promotes consistency and reduces the deadweight costs of uncertainty. To
assist in this practical side of the Article, references to Pareto criteria,
which seem more suited to the lexicons of moral theorists and economists, are translated in Part I of the Article into the most usual and
traditional corporate law language.

I.

MANAGERS' GOALS IN RELATION TO
WEALTH MAXIMIZATION AND WEALTH TRANSFERS

Actions of corporate managers can affect the wealth of stockholders
only in two ways. First, managers' actions can affect the value of the
corporation as a whole. Second, managers' actions can reallocate value
to or away from stockholders.
A simple example of a decision by corporate managers that affects
the overall corporate value is a decision by a CEO or a board of directors
of the corporation to acquire a new machine. If the machine is a
profitable investment for the corporation, the acquisition increases total
corporate value and should, unless other corporate claimants are able to
appropriate all the increased value for themselves, increase the wealth of
the stockholders. Similar increases in corporate value result from
decisions by corporate managers to refinance at a cheaper interest rate an
existing loan to the corporation, to switch to a lower cost supplier of raw
products, or to reduce labor costs by reducing its labor force or lowering
wages. In each of these examples, total stockholder wealth is likely
increased because the corporation, against which stockholders have
claims, increases in value as a result of the action of managers.

Portia Policastro, Note, When DelawareCorporateManagers Turn Auctioneers:
Triggeringthe Revlon Duty After the Paramount Decision, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L.

187 (1991).
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The acquisition of the profitable machine
FIGURE A
v1
(or other managers' decisions that increase
overall corporate value) can be understood by
Preferrd
reference to Figure A and Figure B. In the
figures, total corporate value, or at least one
a
b
version of total corporate value,9 is representCommon
ed by the areas within the circles. Preferred
stockholders' claims against this corporate
value ("preferred stockholders' wealth") are
represented by the areas (designated as "Preferred" in the Figures) within the circles that
FIGURE B
are above the lines a-b, and common stockholders' claims to this corporate value ("com/ .--,,
mon stockholders' wealth") are represented
%
by the areas (designated as "Common" in the
Figures) within the circles that are below the
Common
lines a-b. A simplifying (but inaccurate)
assumption in Figures A and B, which is later
eliminated, is that only stockholders have
claims against the corporate wealth.
Figure A represents the situation prior to the acquisition of the
profitable machine. Figure B represents the total and relative"0 wealth
of stockholders after the acquisition of the machine. The profitable
acquisition increases total corporate value from the area within the circle
V' (represented by the solid circle in Figure A and the broken circle in
Figure B) to the area within the circle V2 in Figure B."

9 For now, total corporate value is limited to the corporate value against
which stockholders have claims. Clearly, other value exists which one rightfully
may consider to be "corporate" value. Most obviously, to refer to normal
accounting practices, assets of the corporation represent corporate value, and
under accounting rules those assets are balanced against the claims of creditors
(liabilities) and the claims of stockholders (equity). One may also consider that
employees have either legally enforceable or morally compelling claims against
corporate value. These matters are treated subsequently in this Article, and the
limiting assumption that only stockholders have claims against corporate value
is removed. For now, it may be helpful to consider Figures A and B as
representing a corporation that has no liabilities.
'0 An assumption in this graphic display that usually is inaccurate is that the
common stockholder and the preferred stockholder share equally in corporate
gains. This assumption is later removed.
" Of course, stockholders' wealth can also be decreased by decisions of
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Examples of managers' actions that reallocate wealth to or away from
stockholders are also easy to find and describe. These actions may
involve a reallocation within a single class of stockholders, between or
among classes of stockholders or between stockholders and other
corporate constituencies, such as creditors or employees.
Examples of management decisions that reallocate corporate wealth
between two classes of stockholders are the old12 single company
recapitalization cases 3 in which managers facilitated changes in the
financial rights of preferred stockholders. In one recurring fact pattern,
managers in corporations with preferred stock in arrears on dividends
facilitated the elimination of the preferred stockholders' dividend arrearages. 4 To the extent that the preferred stockholders were not paid a fair

managers that decrease the total value of the corporation. If the machine is not
profitable, if the interest rate is higher, or if labor or raw materials become more
expensive, the decision by managers to make the change will decrease stockholder wealth.
FIGURE C
Figure C represents state C, the situation
-V 3
following a corporate wealth-decreasing move by
managers. Total corporate value decreased from
/
the area within the broken circle V1 to the area
I'I
Preferred
I
within the circle V3; the assumption is that common stockholders' wealth and preferred stockholders' wealth decreasedby an amount representedby

\

Cm
Como

the shaded areas below and above the line a-b
respectively.
1 Most of these cases arose in a period beginning during the Great
Depression and ending sometime shortly after World War II. See, e.g., Alfred F.
Conrad, Manipulation of Share Priorities- the Record of 79 Listed Securities,
8 VAND. L. REv. 55 (1954) (surveying cases between 1932 to 1951). Of course,

such cases occur thereafter. See, e.g., Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d
1396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,429 U.S. 887 (1976); Bove v. Community Hotel
Corp., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969).
'"A "single company recapitalization" means a transaction in which the
contractual rights of stockholders, normally preferred stockholders, are changed
without any significant amalgamation of assets (i.e., without, for example, a
merger occurring).
14 Examples of such cases include Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F.
Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), afffd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Western Foundry
Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Il. 1949); Iowa ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 31
N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948), cert.denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Dratz v. Occidental
Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35
A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.), aff'd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944); Buckleyv. Cuban American
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value for their lost arrearages, the transaction transferred value from the
preferred stockholders to the common stockholders.15
Figure D shows the Corporation following such a move by managers. The factual

assumptions of the figure are as follows: the
managers facilitate a single company recapitalization that eliminates preferred stockholders' arrearages; the preferred stockholders are
paid less than fair value for their lost arrearages,, 6 and the total value of the corporation

FIGURE D

v'
Prefefld

Common

Sugar Co., 19 A.2d 820 (N.J. Ch. 1940); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249
A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969).
"5Not surprisingly, single company recapitalization cases attracted a lot of
critical comment over the years. See Arno C. Becht, Corporate Charter
Amendments: Issues of PriorStock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50
COLuM. L. REv. 900 (1950); Amo C. Becht, Changesin the Interestsof Classes
of Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amendments Reducing Capital and
Altering Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking Fund Provisions, 36 CORNELL
L.Q. 1 (1950); Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., VoluntaryRecapitalizations,Fairness,
and Rule 10b-5: Life Along the Trail of Santa Fe, 66 Ky. L.J. 267 (1977-78);
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., FairandEquitable Recapitalizations,55 HARv. L. REv.
780 (1942); Elvin R. Latty, Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial
Changes in Senior Shares, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (1952); Note, A Standardof

Fairnessfor CompensatingPreferredShareholdersin CorporateRecapitalizations, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1965).
16 Preferred stockholders subjectedto such actions typically enjoy protective
provisions that diminish the risk of unfair treatment. Thus, for example,
depending on the law of the particular state, preferred stockholders may enjoy
voting rights, see REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT § 10.04(a)(9) (1991),
and fiduciary protection. For cases applying fiduciary constraints to such
transactions, see Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F.2d 944 (3d Cir.
1943), cert. denied,345 U.S. 886 (1945); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53
F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Goldman v.
Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,
32 A.2d 148 (Del. Ch. 1943); Iowa ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853
(Iowa 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar
Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.), affd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944); Kamena v. Janssen
Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200 (N.J. Ch. 1943); Zobel v. American Locomotive Co.,
44 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249
A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952). One
should observe, however, that preferred shareholders, at least historically, have
not fared well in these transactions and often have been subjected to significant
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is otherwise unaffected by the transaction. 7 The broken line a-b
represents the division of wealth between the common and preferred
stockholders before the recapitalization, and the solid line a'-bl represents
the division after the recapitalization. Preferred stockholders lost and
common stockholders gained an amount represented by the shaded area
between the line a-b and line a'-bl.
An example of a managers' decision that reallocates wealth within a
single class of stockholders is an affiliated merger. Assume that Parent
Corp. owns seventy percent of Sub Co. and that the balance of Sub Co.
is publicly owned. If the managers of Sub Co. facilitate a merger of Sub
Co. into Parent at an unfairly low exchange price, the managers of Sub
Co. facilitate a wealth transfer from the minority stockholders of Sub Co.
to the majority stockholder of Sub Co., which is Parent Corp.
The graphic illustration of that transaction
FIGURE E
is seen in Figure E, which again indulges a
simplifying, but probably inaccurate, assumpminority
tion that the affiliated merger does not increase total corporate value (this assumption
is removed later). Figure E, for simplificaMajority
tion purposes, assumes that only common
stockholders have claims against the corporate wealth, and thus the division of value
between majority stockholders and minority stockholders prior to the merger is represented by the broken line a-b. As a result of the unfair acquisition, the
assumption is that the minority receives value only equal to the area
above the solid line a'-b' while the majority winds up with value equal
to the area below line a'-b'. Thus, the majority gains and the minority
loses an amount represented by the shaded area between the lines a-b and
a'-b 1.

Admittedly, life is more complicated than is apparent from the
foregoing figures with their sterilizing assumptions. For example, it is
highly unlikely that Figure B accurately represents the situation following
the purchase of the profitable machine, since, most obviously, the normal

losses of value.
"7This is a correct assumption, provided the transaction is tax neutral. The
elimination of arrearages affects only the division of value among stockholders.
If in fact the market values the total of common and preferred claims following
the recapitalization higher (or lower) than before the recapitalization, the result
is irrational.
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FIGURE F
contractual cap on the dividends of the preferred stockholders means that the wealth of
the common stockholders and the preferred
Preferred
stockholders would most likely be affected
disproportionately. Thus, the post-investment
wealth and gains by the respective stockholdCommon
ers might be more appropriately represented
by Figure F. In that figure, the gains by the
preferred stockholders from the purchase of
the profitable machine are represented by the
lightly shaded area between circle V and V2 , and the gains of the
common stockholders are represented by the darkly shaded area between
circle V and V2.'"
All this is complicated even further if one removes the unrealistic
assumption that total corporate value is shared only by corporate
stockholders. In fact, of course, other constituencies have claims against
corporate wealth. The most obvious of these constituencies are creditors
and employees of corporations, both of whom have expectations,
principally contractual in nature, of sharing in the value generated by
corporate operations.
FIGURE G
Figure A as a starting point, therefore,
V1
still,
(but
more
is misleadingly simple. The
perhaps, not totally) complete representaCredit.tion of the corporation may be Figure G,"
l represents not
V
within
area
the
in which
Common
only the total value of the expectations of
Prferd
stockholders, but also includes the value of
the expectations of the corporation's creditors
and employees.2"

"sThe economic reason for the preferred stock's increase in'value following
the profitable investment, even though, we are assuming, the preferred stock is
non-participatory preferred (i.e., enjoys only fixed dividends), is that the stream
of earnings anticipated by the preferred stockholders, though fixed in amount,
becomes less risky, at least to some degree, following the profitable investment.
19 The ordering of the claims in the figure (i.e., preferred claims, being
on the bottom and employee claims, being on the top) is intended to have no
significance. The claims are placed in that order only as a way to make
illustrations clearer and more compact. Also, no significance is intended by
the claimants' relative portion of the area of circle V' in Figure G. Obviously the
relative and absolute claims of such constituencies vary in each corporation.
20 If Figures A and G represent the same corporation, then definitionally the
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Starting with Figure G, therefore, and
FIGURE H
V1
then moving to Figure H, one can graphically
v2
represent the result of the corporation's pur%
chase of a new profitable machine. In Figure
H, which represents the situation following
I
Common
the purchase of the machine, the area between
1
2
Pere
V and V represents the gain from the new
machine, and in light of the previously expressed assumption that preferred stockholders, creditors and employees have essentially fixed claims or expectations,
one may assume that the common stockholders will gamer the largest part
of the gain represented in Figure H.
Again starting with Figure G, one is able to provide an example of
a wealth transfer between stockholders and a non-stockholder constituency by reference to a highly leveraged acquisition. Often in these
transactions, creditors of the target suffer a significant dilution in the
value of their investment as a result of the additional leverage generated
in the acquisition.2 ' The claim of the creditors, which no one seems seriously to dispute, is that the lost value of the
FIGURE I
debt instruments is appropriated in these
transactions by stockholders.22 Assuming the
VEmployes
correctness of this claim,23 and further asbCreditors
al
suming (although this second assumption in
ab
most instances may be incorrect) that the
comon
highly leveraged transaction does not increase
the overall value of the target, Figure I reprePreferred
sents the situation after news of the highly
24
leveraged acquisition is absorbed by the market.

area under V in Figure G is greater than the area under Vl in Figure A, since
Figure G represents the expectations of more claimants.
See infra notes 104 and 119-22 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 104.
23 The appropriation could

have been by either the old stockholders or the
new stockholder (the acquiror). For the purposes of the graphic representations,
I assume the value was acquired by the old stockholders, although a contrary
assumption in no way changes the results of my analysis.
24 The gains are measured by reference to the time at which the information

of the acquisition is absorbed in the market in order to avoid the graphic
difficulty of dealing with any allocation of gains to the acquiror. Allocation of

the total stockholder gains between the old target stockholders and the acquiror,
however, does not change the outcome of this analysis.
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In Figure I, therefore, V', is unchanged from Figure G, since the
assumption is that the value of the corporation is not increased by the
change in control, but line a-b becomes line a'-b', reflecting the
expropriation by common stockholders of part of the value of the creditors. The extent of the expropriation is represented by the shaded area in
Figure I between lines a-b and a'-b'.2 s
A management decision can, of course, affect both the overall value
of the corporation and reallocate wealth among constituencies. An
example of this can be constructed again by reference to a highly
leveraged acquisition, but now one must remove the assumption of no
increase in value of the target as a result of the change in control. In fact,
the economic data indicates that removing the assumption is realistic,
since the premiums paid stockholders in such transactions appear to be
generated both by wealth transfers from creditors and by the effect of
transferring control of the corporations to new owners/managers, who,
presumably, think they can manage the company more efficiently and
thus are willing to pay a premium over market value for the company.26
Figures G and J portray such a highly leveraged transaction in which
the total value of the corporation increases by transferring control to more
' An interesting inversion of this example is found in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), where the
board of directors of Revlon, in the face of a hostile bid for Revlon, accepted a
competing bid from a white knight and attempted to justify the move as a way
to protect the value of certain of Revlon's outstanding notes. Id. at 184.
Stockholders, however, successfully claimed that the protection of the creditors
through accepting the bid of the white knight came at the expense of the value
of the stockholders' investments and that, accordingly, the action of Revlon's
board in accepting the bid was not consistent with the board's fiduciary duty to
common stockholders. Id. In essence, the common stockholders claimed that the
decision of the managers to protect Revlon's notes through the acceptance of
the white knight's bid transferred wealth from common stockholders to creditors.
26 Regarding the expropriation of creditors' wealth by stockholders in highly
leveraged transactions, see Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The
Corporation,theBondholderandFiduciaryDuties,10 J. L. & CoM. 187, 187-91
(1991); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds:
BondholderProtectionor ManagementEntrenchment?,40 UCLA L. REv. 931,
933 (1993); McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, supra note 6, at 206.
Professors Kahan and Klausner and Professor Coffee report the results of studies
indicating that stockholder gains from highly leveragedtransactions exceedlosses
to bondholders. John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions:CorporateGovernance
as a Multi-PlayerGame, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1498 (1990); Kahan & Klausner,
supra, at 940.
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efficient managers and at the same time
FIGURE J
V1
wealth is transferred from creditors to stock2
holders. Figure G represents the state of
E Employees,
ta
affairs before any information about the
leveraged buyout is absorbed by the market.27 Figure J represents the state of affairs
Common
after news of the leveraged buyout is absorbed by the market for the corporation's
equity and debt securities. The gain in total
corporate value resulting from the transaction
is represented by the area between V' and V2, and the assumption is that
the gain is appropriated by common stockholders. In addition, stockholders gain as a result of expropriation of creditors' value (due to the highly
leveraged nature of the transaction). That additional gain by the stockholders is represented by the area between line a-b and a'-b.
To complete this diagrammatic display, it may be helpful to
hypothesize a situation in which one group of investors, common
stockholders in this case, is able to increase its wealth even though the
total wealth of the corporation is decreased by the move. An example of
this occurs when corporate managers facilitate a sale of all of the
common stock of the corporation to a corporate looter. Because the new
owner (the looter) intends to mismanage the corporation by, for example,
diverting necessary operating funds to itself through inflated salaries or
perhaps even through theft, the total value of the corporation decreases.
The selling stockholder, however, is able to increase its total wealth by
selling to the looter the opportunity to loot the corporation (i.e., the
opportunity to expropriate part of the wealth of the other constituencies).
This transaction is represented by reference to Figure G, which represents the situation before information of the sale to the Employees FIGURE K
looter is absorbed in the market value of the Creditor
rV
.
various claims against corporate value, and
3
/
Figure K, which represents the situation after
Common
/
information concerning the sale to the looter
/
\
is fully absorbed into the respective values.
Although the total value of the corporation is
reduced by the area between V' and V3, the
Preferred
total wealth of the common stockholder is
increased from Figure G to Figure J, because
'.

27 See supra notes 23 and 24.
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the common stockholder expropriated a large part of the wealth of the
preferred stockholders, creditors and employees.
Admittedly, the foregoing explanations may be overly long and
tedious, but important, if somewhat simple, points are to be made here.
Specifically, actions by corporate managers can affect the wealth of
stockholders and other corporate constituencies only by changing total
corporate wealth or by reallocating wealth among or within corporate
constituencies. Alternatively, managers' actions can affect both total
wealth and the distribution of wealth, and as shown above, the effects
may, with respect to stockholders or any corporate constituency, go in
opposite directions at the same time. The dynamics of all this are
important as one considers the obligation of corporate managers to pursue
Pareto superior states on behalf of corporate stockholders.
II.

MANAGERS' GOALS IN

RELATION TO PARETO SUPERIORITY
The common law of corporate fiduciary duties is best understood in
terms of an obligation on corporate managers to take any step that moves
corporate stockholders to a Pareto superior state. Thus, corporate
managers are obligated under the common law to make all moves in
which, as a result of the move, at least one stockholder is better off and
no stockholder is worse off. Some cases, certainly, stray from these
principles, but those cases are aberrational, and when clearly confronted
with a choice, courts nearly always require managers to pursue Pareto
superiority on behalf of corporate stockholders.
Restating these Pareto obligations of corporate managers in the terms
of the narrative descriptions and graphic representations in Part I of this
Article, managers, first of all, are obligated to pursue maximization of
total stockholder wealth. This obligation of corporate managers follows
from the Pareto criteria, since if a move by managers makes at least one
stockholder better off and no stockholder worse off, then definitionally
total stockholder wealth increases. Thus, relating this to the prior
examples and graphic displays, managers are required to purchase the
profitable machine that moves the corporation from the state represented
by Figure A to the state represented by Figure B.
Continuing to restate managers' Pareto obligations in the terms of
Part I, and qualifying somewhat the obligation expressed immediately
above, corporate managers are prohibited from making any move that
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transfers wealth away from any stockholder or group of stockholders.28
This rule is merely a restatement of the Pareto requirement that the move
make no stockholder worse off. Managers, accordingly, are prohibited by
their fiduciary duties from facilitating the unfair elimination of preferred
stockholder arrearages, represented in Figure D, or the unfair affiliated
merger, represented by Figure E, since both transactions violate the
obligation of managers to avoid wealth transfers detrimental to stockholders.
As is apparent from the foregoing formulation, courts, when
measuring whether a move by corporate managers makes anyone better
off or worse off, consider only the interests of corporate stockholders.
Stated otherwise, in measuring the impact of moves by corporate
managers, courts limit the relevant universe for the application of the

A necessary corollary of these two Pareto-based rules is that managers
must, to the extent possible, make any move that is Kaldor-Hicks efficient and
turn that move into a Pareto superior move. This important point, however,
requires some definition and explanation.
A move is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the winners from the move could
compensate the losers from the move, whether or not such compensation in fact
28

occurs. See MURPHY &

COLEMAN,

supra note 4, at 186.

Assume, for example, that prior to an affiliated merger the value of a
minority interest in a company is $10, while the company as a whole (including
the minority interest) is valued at $100. In the affiliated merger, however, the
minority stockholder is paid only $5 for his or her interest, even though as a
result of the efficiencies from the merger the total value of the company
increases to $110. This affiliated merger is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because the
winner, the majority stockholder who gains $15 from the transaction, could
compensate the loser, the minority stockholder, even though, let us assume, the
majority stockholder does not in fact compensate the minority stockholder for its
$5 loss. The merger, however, is not a Pareto superior move, since without some
compensation to the minority, the minority is a loser as a result of the transaction.
The obligation of corporate managers to pursue Pareto superior transactions
on behalf of stockholders should logically include the obligation to pursue this
affiliated merger, since it is wealth-maximizing, but to restructure the transaction
in such a way that the loss to the minority stockholder is eliminated. One
distinguished commentator has observed that restructuring deals in ways that turn
Kaldor-Hicks efficient transactions into Pareto superior transactions normally can
be easily done. Morey W. McDaniel, StockholdersandStakeholders,21 STETSON
L. REV. 121, 134 n.43 (1991) [hereinafter McDaniel, Stockholders and
Stakeholders] ("[M]anagers, acting as agents for all participants, can arrange
cheaply, if not costlessly, for the necessary side payments.").
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Pareto concepts to stockholders only. Again referring to the graphic
representations of Part I of this Article, Figure A, which includes only
stockholders, and not Figure G, which includes other constituencies, is the
correct representation of the starting point (i.e., the universe) for
evaluating managers' moves and decisions.
Importantly, this means that a move instituted by corporate managers
can be Pareto superior within the stockholder-only universe even though
the move creates numerous and significant financial losers, so long as
those losers are not corporate stockholders. Return to the example of the
highly leveraged acquisition. In Figures G and J in Part I of this Article,
the highly leveraged acquisition is portrayed in relation to the broader
universe that includes constituencies other than stockholders. The
assumptions in those Figures are that the move, the highly leveraged
acquisition, increases total stockholder wealth both as a result of the
increase in total corporate wealth, which is derived from the efficiencies
of the transaction, and as a result of the wealth transfers from creditors
to stockholders. Viewed in relation to this more expansive universe, the
transaction generates losses for creditors. Within the more limited
stockholder-only universe, however, the assumptions are that total
stockholder wealth is increased and no stockholder loses as a result of the
transaction. Thus, the highly leveraged acquisition moves the stockholderonly universe to a Pareto superior state and must be pursued by managers, even though losers are created in other groups.
Although so limiting the relevant universe to stockholders creates
certain moral issues,2 9 the limitation ameliorates a significant, practical
obstacle to the use of Pareto superiority as a guide for decisionmaking.
Critics of Pareto criteria correctly point out that the criteria of a Pareto
superior move are nearly impossible to meet in the real world,3 ° since
in the unlimited universe of the real world, nearly all moves create losers.
As Professor Dworkin observes, "there are few Pareto-inefficient
states." 3
This extremely broad limitation on the use of Pareto criteria would
seemingly always be present if Pareto criteria are used to evaluate
In two separate articles the author articulates reasons for expanding the
protection of fiduciary duties beyond the stockholder-only universe. Campbell,
Limited Liability, supra note 6, at 55-71; Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary
Principles,supra note 3.
3 See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 4, at 186; POSNER, supra note 1,
at 14.
3'Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 . LEGAL STUD. 191, 193
29

(1980).
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managers' decisions in an unlimited universe. For example, in an
unlimited universe, a simple decision by corporate managers to shift to
a more economical supplier of electrical cable would create waves of
losers, including not only the owners of the former, less efficient supplier
itself, but also the old supplier's employees, creditors, managers,
suppliers, and merchants in the town where the supplier maintains its
business, and the list goes on.
No need exists to belabor the obvious point, which is that virtually
any management decision, even one that most consider to be in the best
interests of the corporation and society, creates layers of losers. By
limiting the application of Pareto concepts to a universe that encompasses
only stockholders, however, courts are faced with a much more manageable task in applying Pareto criteria.
In addition to applying Pareto criteria to the stockholder-only
universe, courts utilize financial costs as opposed to economic costs in
determining whether a move by managers makes stockholders better or
worse off. This compromise also is essential as a practical matter if
Pareto criteria are to provide a workable paradigm for courts. The matter
requires some further explanation, however.
Economists typically define costs to include more than just financial
costs.32 Assume, for example, that Alpha Corporation builds a financially profitable building that is considered by everyone but one of the
corporation's stockholders, Mr. Adams, to be the most beautiful building
ever built. Mr. Adams, who lives across the street from the building and
owns only one share of Alpha, however, considers the building horribly
ugly. If we assume that Mr. Adams would be willing to pay up to $10 for
the removal of the building, and that his proportionate share of the
increase in the value of Alpha because of the construction of the
profitable building is $1, Mr. Adams has suffered an economic loss of $9
as a result of the construction of the building, even though he actually
gained as a financial matter.
Courts, in demanding that managers pursue Pareto superiority on
behalf of stockholders, measure gains and losses in financial terms and
not in economic terms. Thus, referring to the above example, managers
Judge Posner gives an excellent example of this in his textbook:
If I refuse to sell for less than $250,000 a house that no one else would
pay more than $100,000 for, it does not follow that I am irrational, even
if no "objective" factors... justify my insisting on such a premium. It
follows only that I value the house more than other people. This extra
value has the same status in economic analysis as any other value.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 56.
32
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are obligated to build the financially profitable building, even though it
created an economic (but not financial) loss for Mr. Adams and,
accordingly, if measured in such economic terms was not a Pareto
superior move. However appealing it is to demand that managers pursue
Pareto superiority as measured by economic values, such a requirement
suffers from the same difficulties discussed earlier regarding an unlimited
universe. Managers simply cannot calculate when a decision will cause
some non-financial, economic loss to a stockholder, and courts do not
demand such a criterion be applied.
The common law fiduciary duties of corporate managers, therefore,
are best understood as an obligation that managers pursue Pareto superior
states, but only within the stockholder-only universe and only measured
by financial, as opposed to economic, values.
Ill.

A.

THE CASES

The Application of GeneralPrinciples

The obligation to pursue Pareto superior states on behalf of a
stockholder-only universe requires corporate managers to make wealthincreasing moves on behalf of stockholders and to make no move that
creates a loser among the stockholders. 3
The first of these obligations, to make moves that increase the total
wealth of the stockholder-only universe, explains the outcomes of many
of the classic corporate fiduciary duty cases that may appear unrelated.
For example, in Dodge v. FordMotor Co.34 the court concluded that
Henry Ford was improperly pursuing a course that was not in the
interests of maximizing the profits of Ford's stockholders, but, instead,
was attempting to improve the life of Ford's workers and improve
consumer welfare by providing even more and cheaper cars for the
public. In the course of the opinion the court stated: "A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders."3'
Smith v. Van Gorkom36 is also explained by reference to the
obligation of corporate managers to pursue wealth-maximizing and thus

" See supra note 28, for the obligation of managers in the event these two
rules conflict.
34 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
35

1Id.at 684.

36

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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Pareto superior states on behalf of stockholders, since underlying the board's
breach of its fiduciary duty in that case was its failure to take steps necessary
to facilitate a wealth-maximizing sale of the corporation.37
A third and also quite different type of case, but one that is equally
interesting and equally demonstrative of the obligation of managers to pursue
Pareto superiority through wealth-maximizing moves on behalf of stockholders, is McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc.38 In that case,

Wherehouse in a prospectus circulated in connection with a public sale of its
debentures stated that the contractual protection accorded the debenture
holders under a poison put provision could be waived by a majority of
'
Wherehouse's "Independent Directors."39
The Second Circuit, however,
concluded that such a statement may have misled the debenture holders
regarding the protection of the provision, since the directors "would never
protect the interest of debenture holders except by coincidence because, as
ordinary directors, they were required by law to protect the interest of the

shareholders. ' 0
The second component of managers' Pareto superior obligation, to create
no losers within the stockholder-only universe, also explains many apparently
theoretically distinct corporate fiduciary duty cases. The lexicon of these cases
expresses this part of the Pareto superior obligations not in terms of the
"creation of losers" or even in terms of "wealth transfers" but,instead, as the
obligation to avoid transactions that are "unfair," 4' "grossly unfair," or
' 42
amount to "constructive fraud.
37 Id. at 872.
31 900 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1990).
31 Id. at 577-78.
40 Id. at 580. The Second Circuit held that ajury issue was

present regarding
the question of whether the disclosures were misleading. Id. at 580-82.
Cases are, of course, replete with statements regarding the obligation of
corporate managers to maximize the value of the stockholder-only universe. See,
e.g., Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 481
U.S. 69 (1986) (holding that managers' obligation is "stockholder wealth
maximization"). Consolidating works, such as the American Law Institute's

Principles of Corporate Governance, discuss the "economic objective" of a
corporation, which is the objective of "enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (American Law
Institute 1994).
" See, e.g., Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Walter J. Schloss Assocs. v.
Chesapeake& Ohio Ry., 536 A.2d 147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Gries Sports
Enters. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
42 Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418, 422 (D. Del. 1944)
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Two situations considered earlier, single company recapitalizations4 3
and affiliated acquisitions,' are, perhaps, the most apparent examples
of courts' unwillingness to permit managers' decisions that create
financial losers in the stockholder-only universe. Corporate recapitalizations are typically initiated by common stockholders through their
surrogates, the corporate managers, and are designed to change part or all
of the preferred stockholders' bundle of rights.45 The catalyst for the
recapitalizations is normally some change in economic circumstances that
convinces the common stockholders and the corporate managers that a
"rebargaining" of the preferreds' rights is in the best interests of the
common stockholders. In a number of older cases, for example, arrearages in the preferred stock dividends had built up and had to be
eliminated (or paid) before the board could once again begin paying
dividends to common stockholders.4 6 A favorable change in the business

(using phrases such as "so unfair as to amount to constructive fraud;" and "gross
unfairness;" - but looking more like a fairness analysis under the old Delaware
block approach); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 200 (D.
Del. 1943), aftfd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944) (using "constructive fraud," "bad
faith" and "gross unfairness"); Bowman v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753 (Ill.
1959) (using standard of "actual or constructive fraud" or "bad faith or reckless
indifference," although analysis looks more like a fairness analysis); Bove v.
Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 92 (R.I. 1969) (refusing to select a
standard, since the recapitalization met even the most rigorous standard of
fairness).
In some older cases, however, courts seem to indicate that no fiduciary or
equitable rules are implicated by single company recapitalizations. Goldman v.
Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763, 767-68 (D. Del. 1948); Franzblau v. Capital
Sec. Co., 64 A.2d 644, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949).
4 See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
"See supra page 464.
4 Examples of changes of specific rights of preferred stockholders include
Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D. Del. 1943) (changing
preferred's liquidation preference); and Bowman v. Armour & Co., Superior
Court, Cook County 1959 (unreported) (changing redemptive rights), rev'd, 160
N.E.2d 753 (1959). In Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418, 424-25
(D. Del. 1944) and Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 100 (R.I.
1969) the preferred stockholders' entire bundle of rights was changed.
' Cases involving the elimination of preferred arrearages include Barrett v.
Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), affd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d
Cir. 1944); Westem Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); Iowa ex
rel. Weedev. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918
(1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949); Wessel v.
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fortune of the company generated cash for dividends, thereby creating a
strong incentive in the common stockholders to eliminate the arrearages
in order to claim the earnings for themselves through dividends.
Although such recapitalizations require approval of corporate
stockholders, including, typically, the preferred stockholders voting as a
class or a group,47 corporate managers are the linchpins in the transaction from both a legal and a practical point of view. Legally, any
merger" or any amendment to articles of incorporation changing the
rights of the preferred,4 9 which are the techniques utilized to effect
recapitalizations," must start as a board resolution approving the merger

Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.), aff'd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944);
Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar Co., 19 A.2d 820 (N.J. Ch. 1940); Bove v.
Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969).
Much has been written on this matter, although most pieces are somewhat
older. See, e.g., Arno C. Becht, Alterations ofAccruedDividends, 49 MICH. L.
REV. 363, 565 (1951); E. Merrick Dodd, Accrued Dividends in Delaware
Corporations- From Vested Rights to Mirage, 57 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1944);
E.R. Latty, Fairness- The FocalPoint in PreferredStock ArrearageElimination, 29 VA. L. REV. 1 (1942). Professor Brudney's piece on this matter is
outstanding: Victor Brudney, StandardsofFairnessand the Limits ofPreferred
Stock Modifications, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973) [hereinafter Brudney,
Standards ofFairness].
47 REVISED MODEL BusINESs COP. ACT § 10.03 (1991) (requiring
stockholder approval for amendments to the articles of incorporation) and §
11.03 (requiring shareholder approval for mergers).
48 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.03 (1991) requires that each
of the parties' boards of directors must approve the merger.
49 REVISED MODEL BuSINESS CORP. ACT § 10.03 (1991) requires such
amendments be proposed and approved by the board of directors.
" Examples of cases in which recapitalizations were effected through
amendments to the articles of incorporation include Bailey v. Tubize Rayon
Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F.
Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1943), affid, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Western Foundry
Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); Iowa ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 31
N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Franzblau v.
Capital Sec. Co., 64 A.2d 644 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949); Wessel v.
Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.), affid, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944);
Kamenav. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d 200 (N.J. Ch. 1943), aff'd, 35 A.2d 894
(N.J. 1944).
Examples of cases in which recapitalizations were effected through the
merger mechanism include Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341 (Mich.
1949); Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969); Matteson v.
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or amendment. Practically, managers (in league with the common
stockholders) always initiate and draft the plan of recapitalization and
control the proxy machinery, the corporate treasury, information flows
and the timing of the transaction. 5
Finally, when managers facilitate such recapitalizations, their interests
are aligned with common stockholders, and thus they are in a conflict of
interest with respect to the preferred stockholders in the transaction.52
Not surprisingly, therefore, preferred stockholders subjected to recapitalizations often complain that they are treated unfairly or, in Pareto terms,
made losers by the transactions.
Although courts, especially in earlier decades, often did quite poorly
with these cases, 3 a fiduciary limitation emerged on recapitalizations
that make losers of preferred stockholders. Typically, this limitation, as
stated above, is expressed in terms of a requirement that such recapitalizations be "fair" or free of "constructive fraud." The point is, however,
that these fiduciary standards limit management actions that effect wealth
transfers detrimental to preferred stockholders.

Ziebarth, 242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952).
"' See, e.g., Brudney, Standards ofFairness,supra note 46.

This is true even if managers have no significant ownership interest in the
common stock, since common stockholders elect managers. While this "election"
is often indirect and certainly managers, as rational maximizers, will attempt to
expropriate value for themselves, nonetheless in any allocation decision involving
only common stockholders, on the one hand, and preferred stockholders, on the
other, managers favor common stockholders, since common stockholders vote on
managers and preferred stockholders usually do not.
51 Courts, for example, sometimes have failed to define with any precision
the equitable norm limiting such transactions. See, e.g., Franzblau v. Capital Sec.
Co., 64 A.2d 644 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949). The Franzblaucourt spoke of
both "unfairness" and "bad faith." Id. at 649. Later the court stated: "The fairness
or unfairness of corporation action may not be considered where that action is
in exercise of a power conferred upon the corporation by the Act under which
it was organized .... [T]he Court... cannot operate to nullify the corporate
power conferred by law ... ." Id. Similar lack of precision regarding the
applicable norm is found in Bailey v. Tubize Corp. 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del.
1944).
In other cases, for example, courts have merely presented narrative
comparisons without any attempt to quantify the value of the interests of
preferred stockholders before and after the recapitalization. See, e.g., Bowman
v. Armour & Co., 160 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1959); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39
N.W.2d 341 (Mich. 1949).
52
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The results in cases involving affiliated mergers are also best
explained by the prohibition against managers' decisions or actions that
create losers in the stockholder-only universe. This time, however, it is
common stockholders that complain of mistreatment.
In a typical affiliated merger case, a parent corporation that owns a
majority of the common stock of the subsidiary corporation acquires the
outstanding minority of the subsidiary's common stock in a transaction
in which the parent, because of its control of the subsidiary and the
subsidiary's board, is able to dictate terms, including price. Applying the
intrinsic fairness standard in such instances, courts uniformly hold that
common law fiduciary duties prohibit the completion of the transaction
unless the transaction is "fair" to the minority common stockholders.
Fairness requires, not surprisingly, that the minority common stockholders
receive an amount of consideration that adequately compensates them for
the value of what they lose in the merger.54 Stated in Pareto terms,
therefore, corporate fiduciary duties prohibit managers from facilitating
affiliated mergers that make losers of minority common stockholders.
B. Additional Cases
1. Lock-Ups
In a number of cases, courts have dealt with the question of whether
the board of directors of a target company that is the subject of a bidding
contest may, consistent with its fiduciary duties, grant a lock-up 5 or a

" A small sample of the many affiliatedmerger cases include the following:
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Schreiber v. Bryan, No. 4250, 1979 WL 2706 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 29, 1979); Tanzer v. International General Indus., Inc., 402 A.2d 382
(Del. Ch. 1979); Walter J.Schloss Assocs. v. Chesapeake& Ohio Ry., 536 A.2d
147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Gries Sports Enters., Inc., v. Cleveland Browns
Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
" See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995);
Arnold v. Society for Say. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); QVC Network
Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993), aftd,
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); In re J. P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch.
1988); Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio 1990).
Lock-ups have been the subject of extensive commentary. Stephen M.
Bainbridge, ExclusiveMergerAgreementsandLock-ups in NegotiatedCorporate
Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1990); Douglas M. Baron, Controlling

HeinOnline -- 84 Ky. L.J. 478 1995-1996

1995-96]

CORPORATE FDuCIARY DuTIEs

similar contractual concession5 6 to a favored bidder. While courts, to this
point at least, have been unwilling to declare that the granting of a lockup is per se violative of managers' fiduciary duties, lock-ups have not
fared well in judicial decisions, an outcome that may be explained by the
obligation of managers to pursue Pareto superior states on behalf of
stockholders. Indeed, a consistent application of Pareto criteria may
ultimately lead courts to declare a per se prohibition against the use of
lock-ups.
A representative example and certainly one of the most famous of
cases involving a lock-up is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.," in which Revlon, the target of an unsolicited takeover
bid from Pantry Pride, granted its favored suitor, Forstmann Little, an
asset lock-up. The lock-up provided that if any competing bidder for
Revlon acquired more than 40% of Revlon's stock, Forstmann had the
right to purchase two important divisions of Revlon at a price estimated
to be $100 to $175 million below the market value of the divisions. 8
Competing suitors for Revlon, such as Pantry Pride, therefore, were
Imprudent Lock-ups: The Necessityfor FederalLegislation, 63 WASH. U. L.Q.
91 (1985); Christopher H. Dor, Defending Lockups: Adequate Consideration
and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 481 (1991);
Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward UnlockingLockups, 103 YALE L.J.
1739 (1994); JenniferJ. Johnson & Mary Siegel, CorporateMergers:Redefining
the Role of TargetDirectors,136 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (1987); Stephen P. Lamb
& Andrew J.Turezyn, Revlon and Hanson Trust: Unlocking the Lock-ups, 12
DEL. J. CORP. L. 497 (1987); Kenneth J.Nachbar, Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc. - The Requirement of a Level Playing Field in
ContestedMergers,and its Effect on Lock-ups and OtherBidding Deterrents,12
DEL. J. CORP. L. 473 (1987); Robert W. Rodriguez, Hostile Takeover Contests:
The Rise and Fall of Lock-up Options, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 193;

Alexander B. Johnson, Note, Is Revlon Only Cosmetic?: Structuringa Merger
in the Mid-1990s, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 2271 (1995); Bradley A. Maxa, Note,
The Legality ofLock-ups UnderSection 14(e) of the Williams Act: Balancingthe
Scales, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 115 (1984); Note, Lock-up Options: Toward
a State Law Standard, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1068 (1983); Judi G. Sorensen, Case
Note, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.: Do Suitors of a
Target CorporationHave a "'Rightto Compete"?, 25 IDAHO L. REv. 441 (1989).
56

In addition to lock-ups, parties in takeover battles have also utilized other

devices, including no-shop provisions, best efforts provisions, and cancellation
fees, as a way to terminate or at least diminish the bidding for the target. See
supra note 5.
57 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
58

Id. at 178.
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forced to bid for a Revlon stripped of the prized divisions and without an
amount of cash equal to the fair market value of the divisions.
The court in Revlon declared that a lock-up is not per se illegal.59
Nevertheless, the court held that in the circumstances the granting of the
asset lock-up to the favored bidder, which essentially terminated the
auction for Revlon, violated the fiduciary obligation of Revlon's board
to pursue the "maximization of shareholder profit."6
In another, more recent, highly publicized case, Paramount
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. ("QVC"),6' the Delaware
Supreme Court reached a similar result regarding the grant of a stock
option lock-up. In that case, Paramount was the subject of competing
offers from Viacom and QVC. 62 The Paramount board favored the
Viacom offer and accordingly entered into a definitive merger agreement
with Viacom. That merger agreement contained a no-shop provision, a
$100 million termination fee and a "third and most significant deterrent
device,"'63 which was a stock lock-up that gave Viacom the option to
purchase 23,699,000 shares of Paramount stock at $69.14 per share if
Viacom lost the deal because of a competing bid or if the Paramount
stockholders refused to approve the Viacom acquisition. The enormity of
this lock-up became apparent when QVC's opening bid for Paramount
came in at $80 per share.'
Again, as in Revlon, the QVC court stmck down these provisions as
inconsistent with the fiduciary duty of Paramount's board of directors to
maximize the wealth of the target's stockholder-only universe. The court
found that the lock-up and other such provisions "were impeding the
realization of the best value reasonably available to the Paramount
stockholders. 65
Such hostility to lock-ups and similar provisions is best understood
in terms of the obligation of the target's board to pursue Pareto superior
states. Specifically implicated here is managers' obligation to pursue
wealth-enhancing moves on behalf of the stockholder-only universe. Also
entwined in all this is the suspicion of courts, articulated well in Revlon,
59
60

61

Id. at 176.
Id.at 185.
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).

62 1d. at
63 Id.
at
64 id.
65

36.
39.

Id. at 50.
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that managers' decisions to grant lock-ups to favored bidders are often
biased by managers' own self-interest.
To understand this better, it is helpful to isolate the lock-up and
consider it as a valuable property right of the target company and its
stockholders. Viewed thusly, granting or selling the lock-up to the
favored bidder is like selling any other valuable corporate property right.
Accordingly, the question of whether or not such sale is consistent with
the obligation of managers to move the stockholder-only universe to a
Pareto superior state should seemingly be analyzed the same way as other
transactions involving the sale of valuable corporate property, such as a
machine, a piece of real property, or a whole division. One might,
therefore, question the propriety of the clear, special hostility to the sale
of lock-ups so apparent in cases like Revlon and QVC.
Courts, of course, view the sale of the lock-up in a bidding contest
differently than they view the sale of other corporate property because of
the courts' articulated doubt regarding the objectivity of a target's board
in executing the sale of the lock-ups. Courts find that boards have a
"specter of a conflict" in such situations, and this perceived bias infects
managers' objectivity and leads courts to apply a different analysis in
such instances.66
This analysis may ultimately lead courts to a per se prohibition of
lock-ups. Such a prohibition may appeal to courts as an efficient way to
The development and application of the "proportionality test" as a way
to measure managers' compliance with their fiduciary obligation in a takeover
setting is the clearest manifestation of courts' rejection of the claim that
managers are unbiased in such situations. For cases applying the proportionality
test, see NCR Corp. v. AT&T, 761 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Katz v.
Chevron Corp., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Unitrin, Inc. v.
American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Gilbertv. El Paso Co., 575
A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992); Paramount
Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, No.
14649, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 152 (Del. Ch. Nov. 22, 1995); In re Santa Fe
Pacific Corp., 1995 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCI-) 98,845 (Del. Ch.), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995); QVC Network Inc. v. Paramount
Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch.
1989); Grand Metro. Public Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch.
1988).
66
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ensure that managers pursue Pareto superiority on behalf of the stockholder-only universe.
If a target's managers were fully aligned with the interests of the
target stockholders, courts could reasonably assume that over time lockups would be priced properly, as self-interested buyers and sellers
bargain in a reasonably competitive market for the allocation of lock-ups
and more broadly for companies. Under these assumptions, while a lockup may be over-priced or under-priced in any one particular acquisition, viewed more broadly from the perspective of society, lock-ups
generally would be priced properly in the same way that any corporate
asset (a chair, for example) sold by managers in a reasonably competitive market would be priced properly. A per se prohibition of the sale of
lock-ups, therefore, would not make economic sense under such
assumptions.
If, on the other hand, the facts surrounding the sale of lock-ups are
accurately perceived by courts in that the decisioumakers on the target
side of the transactions are persistently biased by self interest, lock-ups
allocated in market transactions will over time be systematically
mispriced, and as a result companies will be systematically misallocated.
More specifically, lock-ups will be underpriced to favored bidders, which,
in turn, will result in an inefficient allocation of companies. This result
means, in consideration of Pareto criteria, that the sale of lock-ups will
not be value-maximizing for the stockholder-only universe and thus not
a Pareto superior move.
A per se prohibition against the sale of lock-ups may be, therefore,
an attractive way for courts to deal with this inefficiency. Such a
prophylactic rule prohibiting the premature termination of the auction
process may be considered by courts to be the most effective and cost
efficient way to drive managers to conduct consistent with Pareto criteria.
2. Freezeouts and the Business PurposeDoctrine
"Freezeout" is a term used to describe a transaction in which a
majority stockholder forcibly eliminates minority stockholders from any
further equity participation in a particular company. 67 Freezeouts can
occur in various business settings 68 and can be effected through various
For a representative list of articles on freezeouts, see supra note 7.
See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 7 (describing and
analyzing the appropriate treatment of freezeouts by considering whether the
67
68
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corporate mechanisms,6 9 but the fundamental aspect of the transaction
is that the majority stockholder exercises its raw power to acquire for
itself the minority's equity interest in the company.
Courts are hostile toward freezeouts, ° and one manifestation of this
hostility is the adoption by some (but not all) jurisdictions of the business

freezeout eliminates a longstanding subsidiary or a subsidiary recently acquired
through a tender offer).
69 Probably the most usual structure for a freezeout is through a merger
(or, under more modem corporation laws, a share exchange) either into the
majority stockholder (the "parent") or an affiliate of the parent. See, e.g.,
Santa Fe Industries v. Kirby, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate
Corp., 342 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975). Additionally, majority
stockholders have attempted to execute freezeouts as dissolutions, see, e.g.,
Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Ark. 1964);
Zimmerman v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 143 P.2d 409 (1943), reverse
stock splits, see, e.g., Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54
(Ill.) (converting over two million shares into 3,722 shares, and cashing out
any fractional shares), appealdismissed,422 U.S. 1002 (1974); Leaderv. Hycor,
Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1985) (converting two million shares with a par
value of one cent into 500 shares with a par value of $40, and cashing out any
fractional shares), and sales of substantially all the corporation's assets
otherwise than in the regular course of business, see, e.g., Cathedral Estates, Inc.
v. Taft Realty Corp., 157 F. Supp. 895, 897 (D. Conn. 1954), affd, 251 F.2d
340 (2d Cir. 1957); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 74 P. 1004 (Wash.
1904).
70 While the hostility of the common law toward freezeouts is explained
in this Article by reference to Pareto criteria, courts may be influenced by
notions of property rights, even in cases adjudicated under more traditional
ideas of business purpose and intrinsic fairness. Some courts, therefore, may
view minority stockholders' stock as "their" stock and thus are reluctant to
permit the majority stockholder to exercise power of private eminent domain by
taking the stock forcibly from the minority. Coggins v. New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986) has always struck the author
as such a case. The court described the plaintiff, Coggins, thusly: "Coggins, a fan
of the Patriots from the time of their formation, was serving in Vietnam in
1967 when he purchased the shares through his brother. Over the years, he
followed the fortunes of the team, taking special pride in his status as an
owner." Id.at 1115. Commentatorshaveprovidedinterestinganalysesofeminent
domain and the question whether, in some instances, private parties should be
permitted to exercise private eminent domain. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 5661.
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purpose doctrine.71 Under this doctrine, a freezeout is prohibited unless
' a criterion,
the transaction serves some "legitimate corporate purpose,"72
courts have said, that is not met if the freezeout "serves no business
purpose other than the termination of the minority stockholder's interest
"73

This business purpose doctrine is applied in addition to the more
general intrinsic fairness test in affiliated mergers.74 Accordingly,
either unfairness in the terms of the transaction or the absence of a
valid business purpose is an independent basis for enjoining a freezeout.
Requiring that freezeouts have a business purpose, as defined by
courts, promotes wealth-maximizing transactions, which are essential to
71 The most famous

articulation of the business purpose doctrine was by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del.
1977). Six years later, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del.
1983), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed itself and abandoned the business
purpose test.
Today, some states apply the business purpose test, including, for example
Massachusetts (see Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492
N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986)), New York (see Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473
N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984)), Pennsylvania (see Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648
F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1981)), Indiana (see Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind.
1977)), and Missouri (see Laird v. ICC, 691 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1982)), while
other states, in addition to Delaware, do not. Minnesota (see Sifferle v.
Micom Corp., 384 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)), Kentucky (see Yeager
v. Paul Semonin Co., 691 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985)), Illinois (see
Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 1974)), and
Wisconsin (see Rosenstein v. CMC Real Estate Corp. 522 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988)).
72 Coggins, 492 N.E.2d at 1118.
73 Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566, 573 (N.J. 1975) (citing
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins, Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974) and rejecting the
Fifth Circuit approach).
7 See, e.g., Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492
N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986); Leaderv. Hycor, Inc., 479 N.E.2d 173 (Mass. 1985);
and Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984). Other courts
seem timid in embracing the bifurcated requirements, and will dispose of the case
on other grounds without reaching the issue or a required business purpose as
seen in Lerner v. Lemer, 511 A.2d 501 (Md. 1986); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate
Corp., 342 A.2d 566, 573 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975); and Stringer v. Car
Data Sys., Inc., 841 P.2d 1183 (Or. 1992).
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Pareto superior moves. The application of a business purpose test to
freezeouts, therefore, is consistent with a commitment to Pareto criteria,
although a more complete explanation of the business purpose doctrine
and its development is required to explain this point.
Freezeouts are initiated by the majority stockholders (or, more
accurately, by their surrogates, corporate managers) and accordingly are
designed to promote the self interest of the majority stockholders.
Referring back to the discussion in Part I, a freezeout, like any other
corporate transaction, can advance majority stockholders' financial self
interest only through an increase in the total value of the stockholder-only
universe or through an expropriation by majority stockholders of part of
the wealth of the minority stockholders.75
A freezeout fueled by the first of these incentives, an increase in the
total wealth in the stockholder-only universe, would meet the business
purpose test. This conclusion is predicated on the premise that a move
that advances total stockholder wealth is a move that advances a valid
' This wealth-increasing
business purpose of the "corporation."76
freezeout
would also be a Pareto superior move within the stockholder-only
universe, assuming, of course, that minority stockholders' value is not
expropriated in the transaction.
Managers acting on behalf of a majority stockholder may, however,
have an incentive to pursue a freezeout that does not increase the total
stockholder wealth if the freezeout is a vehicle through which the
majority stockholder is able to expropriate part of the value of minority
stockholders' interest in the corporation. In such a case, where the
transaction does not increase total stockholder wealth but, instead, is
fueled solely by expropriation, the freezeout is without a "legitimate
corporate purpose" and thus is illegal. Prohibiting such a freezeout
under the business purpose doctrine is, again, consistent with Pareto
criteria, since that freezeout, by definition, makes losers of minority
stockholders.
The results under the business purpose analysis in a third factual
configuration, however, are impossible to explain under Pareto criteria.
" See supra notes 10-27 and accompanying text. Majority stockholders'
interest can, of course, be advanced by a combination of an increase in total
stockholder wealth and expropriation of minority wealth.
76 Typically, for example, courts are willing to find a business purpose if the
elimination of minority stockholders generates financial savings or efficiencies.
See, e.g., Cross v. Communication Channels, Inc., 456 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct.
1982); Laird v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 691 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1982).
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In this situation, the freezeout is value-maximizing within the stockholder
universe, but at the same time expropriates part of the value of the
minority stockholders' interest in the corporation. Assume for example
that by freezing out the minority stockholders the corporation is able to
save reporting expenses under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("1934 Act") 77 and able to eliminate certain recordkeeping expenses
necessary to allocate employees and services between the parent and the
subsidiary. At the same time, however, the terms of the freezeout
underpay the minority stockholders for their interest in the corporation.
Thus, the majority stockholder gains two ways: by the savings (which are
an increase in the wealth of the stockholder-only universe) and by
underpaying the minority for their interest.
In this factual configuration, the freezeout would likely survive
against an attack alleging that it had no valid business purpose, because
the total wealth in the stockholder-only universe increases as a result
of the savings generated by the forced elimination of the minority
stockholders. The freezeout, however, is not a Pareto superior move in
the stockholder-only universe, since the minority stockholders are made
losers. As a result, failing to forbid the freezeout under the business
purpose doctrine is not an outcome that is consistent with Pareto
criteria.
To conclude, however, that the business purpose doctrine does not
always ensure an outcome that is consistent with Pareto criteria does not
mean that managers are free to facilitate freezeouts that create losers.
Such non-Pareto freezeouts as the one described above, which may be
permissible under the business purpose doctrine, still cannot pass muster
under common law fiduciary concepts, since the transactions fail the
intrinsic fairness test.
As stated at the beginning of this section, jurisdictions that apply the
business purpose doctrine also continue to apply the intrinsic fairness test
to freezeouts. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.78 and other cases79 emphasize
that the obligation to pay a fair price to stockholders is the very heart of
the intrinsic fairness requirement. Accordingly, even if a freezeout that

15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934) [hereinafter "1934 Act"].
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
See, e.g., Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324 (Del. Ch.
1987); Walter J. Schloss Assoc. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 536 A.2d 147
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); and Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19
(N.Y. 1984).
77
71
71
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increases total wealth in the stockholder-only universe but expropriates
minority stockholder value is considered to meet the business purpose
test, the transaction does not meet the intrinsic fairness test since the
minority stockholders do not receive a "fair price" for their stock. While
courts and commentators over the years have expressed differing views
about the calculation of "price" within the intrinsic fairness test,8 0 the
raw expropriation of minority stockholder wealth by the majority is
impossible to reconcile with the fair price obligation in such transactions.
Together, therefore, the business purpose test and the intrinsic fairness
test protect against non-Pareto freezeouts. The business purpose test
requires that the freezeout be value-maximizing, and the intrinsic fairness
test prohibits freezeouts that make minority stockholders losers.
This discussion, however, raises the question of whether the business
purpose doctrine is merely superfluous, in light of the ubiquitous
application of the intrinsic fairness doctrine to all freezeouts. Delaware,
of course, in Weinbergerv. UOP, Inc."1 concluded that the doctrine had
(in an amazingly short time) outlived its usefulness and that minority
were adequately protected by the
stockholders subjected to freezeouts
82
intrinsic fairness doctrine alone.
The Delaware court was probably on sound ground when it eliminated the business purpose doctrine, since the Pareto function of that
doctrine, which is to ensure that the freezeout is wealth-maximizing for
the stockholder-only universe, is also performed by the intrinsic fairness
test. Assume, for example, that a freezeout is not a wealth-enhancing
move for the stockholder-only universe but, instead, is driven entirely by
expropriation. In that case, the price received by minority stockholders,
which impounds the negative value of an expropriation in the context of
a non-wealth-enhancing freezeout, necessarily creates a loss for minority
For example, prior to Weinberger, Delaware utilized the "Delaware
block" approach to determine the value of minority stockholders' interests in
affiliated mergers. See, e.g., In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 52 A.2d 6,
14-15 (Del. Ch. 1947). See, e.g., Jacques Coe & Co. v. Minneapolis-Moline Co.,
75 A.2d 244 (Del. Ch. 1950); Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 66 A.2d 910 (Del.
Ch. 1949); and In re General Realty & Utils. Corp., 52 A.2d 6 (Del. Ch. 1947).
Weinberger,however, eliminated the Delaware block method for such calculations in Delaware. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13.
81457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
82 Delaware adopted the business purpose doctrine in 1977 in Singer v.
80

Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977) and repealed the doctrine six years
later in Weinberger,457 A.2d at 704.
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stockholders and thus violates the fair price component of the intrinsic
fairness test. The intrinsic fairness test, therefore, even without help from
the business purpose doctrine, appears to ensure that freezeouts both are
limited to wealth-maximizing transactions and create no losers in the
relevant universe.
While one may conclude that the business purpose doctrine is
superfluous, the general common law hostility toward freezeouts, which
led courts, perhaps without necessity, to adopt the business purpose
doctrine, is understandable in relation to a commitment to Pareto criteria,
reflecting, it seems, the judgment by courts that freezeouts are driven
more by expropriation than by efficiencies. Freezeouts that expropriate
value from minority stockholders, of course, create losers and thus are not
Pareto superior moves.
The savings or efficiencies proffered by majority stockholders as a
justification for freezeouts must always be evaluated closely.83 Broadly
stated, savings in agency costs should result if the number of owners is
reduced from a significant number of owners to one owner, which is the
typical result of a freezeout. These savings might result from the
elimination of the strictures of compliance with the reporting and other
requirements under the 1934 Act and certain recordkeeping costs, such
as the cost associated with allocating the salary of employees who may
serve both the subsidiary and its parent."4
83

Easterbrook and Fischel offer up the following as examples of gains from

freezeouts: "economies of scale, centralizedmanagement and corporate planning,
... economies of information"; reduction in "the cost of policing conflicts of
interest"; ability of the merged firn "to make additional cost-justified investments"; "lower agency costs"; elimination of "costs attributable to public
ownership"; gains that result from the fact that the concentration of ownership
"facilitates a takeover" by eliminating the free rider problem. Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions,91 YALE L.J.
698, 706 (1982).
8 A freezeout is not necessary to avoid duplication of functions in
the parent and the partially owned subsidiary. If the two companies need only
one personnel manager, for example, the extra personnel manager can be
terminated, even without a freezeout merger, and each company can pay its pro
rata cost of the single, shared personnel manager. What the freezeout merger
would eliminate, therefore, is not the extra personnel manager but the recordkeeping necessary to allocate the personnel manager's time between the two
companies.
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Such savings may in a relative sense, 5 however, be modest, 6 and
the more likely benefit to majority stockholders may come from the
possibility of expropriating the wealth of minority stockholders. Much has
been written about the considerable strategic and informational advantages that insiders have over outsiders in various "rebargaining" situa85

The significance of the relativity of the size of the savings from the

freezeout compared to the size of the company and its other expenses and
revenues should not be overlooked. Thus for example, an annual savings of
$100,000 is a stronger incentive for a $1 million dollar company than it is for
a $1 billion company.
86 For example, as described supra note 84, elimination of duplicative
positions between the parent and the partially owned subsidiary does not depend
on a freezeout.
The savings associated with elimination of the applicability of the 1934 Act
to a company is an interesting matter and difficult to estimate. In a quiet, typical
year, the principal obligations of a 1934 Act company that generate costs are the
periodic reporting requirements and the proxy solicitation requirements. Even in
a quiet year, the company will encounter other, less significant costs due to the
1934 Act (companies typically assist their officers and directors in their filings
under Section 16(a)), and in an unusual year, such as a year in which the
company may be involved in a takeover contest or a self-tender, the 1934 Act
can generate significant additional costs.
Costs to the company generated by the 1934 Act include the internal costs
of employees who prepare SEC filings and the external costs of attorneys and
auditors. One CEO of a 1934 Act companywith 215 employees and $22 million
in annual revenue estimated annual reporting costs to be $50,000 for attorneys'
and auditor's fees. See Rami Grunbaum, Go Public! Cheap! Fast!, PUGET
SouND Bus. J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 2. Having had experience representing
companies in 1934 Act filings, these estimates seem high to me, at least if

the numbers are offered as the savings a 1934 company will recognize in quiet
years if it is able to avoid the jurisdiction of the 1934 Act. One must recognize, in that regard that many of the 1934 Act expenses may be so intertwined
with other aspects of the business that no savings will result. For example,
accounting data, information about management, etc., may be required by other
regulatory agencies, lenders, or the public generally. It seems unlikely that
the information demanded by the Securities Exchange Commission about the
partially owned subsidiary will become unimportant or unnecessary to collect
and render merely because certain owners are eliminated at the subsidiary
level.
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tions,87 including freezeouts8 8 If one imagines a freezeout involving
minority stockholders of a company having assets of $500 million, an
efficient exploitation of majority stockholders' strategic and informational
advantages may seem likely to generate more new value for the majority
stockholder than the majority stockholder could expect from elimination
of agency costs, such as recordkeeping for shared functions and reporting
under the 1934 Act. In freezeouts, therefore, courts may well conclude
that majority stockholders in most instances probably can make more
money from expropriation than from efficiencies. The hostility toward
freezeouts is likely explained in this manner.
For example, the following articles deal with the possible advantages that
corporate managers (the insiders) have over public stockholders (the outsiders)
in bargaining for the nature and scope of duties that corporate managers owe to
stockholders: Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1420 (1985) [hereinafter
Brudney, CorporateGovernance]("[I]nvestors in large publicly held corporations
have little or no ability to choose or negotiate the terms of management with
original owners who go public or with corporate management .... "); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1521
(1989) ("It is no more likely that buyers in an initial public offering would know
of variations in core fiduciary and structural rules than that buyers of insurance
policies will know the fine print in their policies."); Thomas L. Hazen, The
CorporatePersona,Contract (andMarket) Failure,and Moral Value, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 273, 300 (1991) ("Consent is no more meaningful in a firm that is about
to go public than it is in a firm that is already publicly held.").
Professor Brudney has written extensively about the bargaining failures when
preferred stockholders (the outsiders) bargain with common stockholders and
their surrogates, corporate managers (the insiders), regarding the alteration of the
terms of the preferred stockholders contract. Brudney, Standards of Fairness,
supra note 46. This matter generally was the subject of extensive earlier
literature. See, e.g., Becht, supra note 46, at 565; Dodd, supra note 46; Latty,
supra note 46.
88 See generally Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 7, at
1354; and Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate
Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1974) [hereinafter Brudney &
Chirelstein, Fair Shares], which proffer, among other things, the majority or
insider advantage through control of the proxy machinery. Superior bargaining
power against fractured interests, control of transaction timing, and knowledge
of pending upturns in the corporate future which knowledge is non-public and
not reflected in the market value of shares.
87
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3.

Revlon Duties

In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,8 9 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that once the break-up of the target,
Revlon, "was inevitable," the duty of Revlon's board "changed from
defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the
best price for the stockholders at the sale of the company."9 So stated,
these Revlon duties (this form of the Revlon duties is hereinafter referred
to as "Revlon's affirmative duties") seem unremarkable and entirely
consistent with the obligation of corporate managers to pursue Pareto
superior states on behalf of the stockholder-only universe, since stating
that in the sale of the target company the target managers must get "the
best price for the stockholders" is merely to articulate in specific
circumstances the obligation to maximize the total value of the stockholder-only universe.
The negative implication of Revlon (hereinafter referred to as
"Revlon's negative implication") is a problem, however, since the
indication is that at all other times (i.e., at all times in a corporation's life
except when the break-up is inevitable) the fiduciary duties of the board
of the target do not require the board to pursue wealth maximization on
behalf of the stockholder-only universe. 9 Thus, in the context of a
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
90 Id. at 182. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that the Revlon
duties attach when the target is to be broken up. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 173, 185.
In 1989, in ParamountCommunicationsInc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150, the
same court concluded that Revlon duties attach when a company "initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization
involving a clear break-up of the company" and also when "in response to a
bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative
transaction also involving the break-up of the company." In 1994, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the Revlon duties attach when there is a "sale or change
of control" of the target. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994). In a confusing footnote in that case, however, the
court stated that it uses "the terms 'sale of control' and 'change of control'
interchangeably without intending any doctrinal distinction." Id. at 42 n. 10.
",Language in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 37, 43 n. 13 (Del. 1994) continues this negative implication ("Under the
circumstances of this case, the pending sale of control ... required the
Paramount Board ...to secure the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders.... [W]here a potential sale of control by a corporation is not the
consequence of a board's action, this Court has recognized the prerogative of a
board of directors to resist a third party's unsolicited acquisition proposal or
89
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hostile acquisition, for example, this means that if the target's board
determines not to accede to the hostile takeover bid but, instead, to fight
to retain its control of the target, the board may engage in defensive
tactics that fail to maximize stockholder wealth.
Obviously, Revlon's negative implication cannot be explained by
reference to Pareto criteria, since it permits non-wealth-maximizing
moves by corporate managers. Not surprisingly, therefore, Revlon's
negative implication generates confusion and difficult interpretation
problems for courts.
The most prevalent interpretation matter for courts in relation to the
Revlon duties is the question of whether a particular situation is governed
by Revlon's affirmative duties or Revlon's negative implication. Inevitably, a hostile suitor who believes its bid represents wealth maximization
for the target's stockholders argues that the circumstances trigger
Revlon's affirmative duties, while the defensive-minded target board
argues that Revlon's negative implications control and that, accordingly,
it does not have to accede to the hostile bid, even if the hostile bid is
wealth-maximizing for the stockholder-only universe. Much of the
litigation generated by Revlon, therefore, involves attempts by courts to
define those circumstances where, in the words of the Revlon court, the
"break-up" of the target is "inevitable." 92 If the "break-up" is "inevitable," the situation is governed by Revlon's affirmative duties; if the
"break-up is not "inevitable," the situation is governed by Revlon's
negative implication.
Under a broad and consistent application of Pareto criteria, this entire
line of inquiry is unnecessary and, indeed, misdirected. Corporate
managers under Pareto criteria are required to make wealth-maximizing
moves. If the offer of a hostile or friendly bidder for the target is wealthmaximizing for the target's stockholder, Pareto criteria dictate that
target's managers should facilitate the acquisition by the bidder. If, on the
other hand, either the managers of the target are able to manage the target
in a way that renders value to stockholders in excess of the value offered
by the bidder or a second bidder is willing to pay more for the target,
managers of the target should resist the bid of the first suitor.
offer.").
92 See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1989); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 844 (Del. 1987);
Ivanhoe v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987); In re
Santa Fe Pacific Corp., 1995 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,845 (Del. Ch.), ajfd
in part and rev'd in part, 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995).
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To ask in any of these cases, as the court did in both Revlon93 and
QVC, 94 whether the targets were "for sale" or whether a change of control
was anticipated confuses a Pareto analysis. In all cases, if the obligation of
corporate managers is to pursue Pareto superiority by maximizing the value
of the stockholder-only universe, whether or not in the mind of the target's
board the company is "for sale" is entirely irrelevant.
Part of the explanation for Revlon's negative implication may be the
sensitivity of courts to the increasing pressures that a complex and acquisition-minded business climate puts on managers, which, in turn, increases at
least one aspect of agency costs. 95 Articulating fiduciary obligations in this
area in terms that more closely approximate Pareto criteria and thus rejecting
Revlon's negative implication would mean that managers could never just say
in the face of an offer to acquire their company that "the company is not for
sale." Even more extreme, managers would be saddled with the ubiquitous
obligation to troll for suitors. Courts may fear that such a persistent obligation
on managers to treat every offer of acquisition seriously and affirmatively to
search for suitors who can manage more efficiently than they would be
oppressive to managers. In an economic sense the obligation may raise
agency costs and thus ultimately result in a net loss for stockholders. Such
pressures, in other words, would create their own inefficiencies.
These concerns, however, are unfounded. IfRevlon's negative implication
is eliminated, managers will be obligated to invest in searching for and
responding to bids by suitors only to the extent that such conduct moves the
stockholder-only universe to a Pareto superior state. In other words, managers
should invest in such activity only if it is profitable. Further, if the failure of
managers to invest in this activity is challenged by, for example, an unhappy
stockholder who claims that managers are not aggressive enough in pursuing
suitors, managers are protected by the due diligence defenses of the business
judgment standard or the negligence standard applicable in duty of care cases.
Managers are liable, therefore, only if their failure to pursue suitors or
respond to a bid is either a deviation from ordinary care or an extreme
deviation from ordinary care.
9'Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.

1985).
9'Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994).
9'In simple economic terms, if pressures on managers and thus risks of
personal liability increase, managers will charge the stockholders more for their
management services, which increases one form of agency costs. On the other
hand, to the extent managers manage more efficiently because of the increased
pressures, agency costs decrease.
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In any event, Revlon's negative implication is impossible to square with
the Pareto criteria that courts otherwise apply in fiduciary duty situations.
Additionally, Revlon's affirmative duties add nothing to the longstanding,
previously well-articulated obligation of managers to maximize the total
wealth of the stockholder-only universe, a duty that is part of Pareto criteria.
One would therefore expect courts to discard any separate articulation of the
Revlon duties.
C. The Limits (Apparentand Real) of the ParetoAnalysis
1. PermissibleNon-ParetoMoves by Managers
Corporate managers sometimes, and often without serious challenge,
intentionally undertake transactions that appear to diminish the financial wellbeing of particular stockholders. Such moves seemingly are inconsistent with
an obligation to pursue Pareto superior states on behalf of the stockholderonly universe, and thus the outcomes in these cases require some explanation.
Perhaps the most obvious example of such a move by corporate
managers is a call or redemption of preferred stock. A decision by a board
of directors to exercise a preferred stock redemption privilege appears to
generate a loss for the redeemed preferred stockholders, since the redemption
denies the preferred stockholders the right to participate in any increase in
value in their stock caused by, most typically, falling interest rates.96 One
might assume, therefore, that such preferred stockholders could legitimately
claim that the directors initiating the call violated their fiduciary duty to the
preferred stockholders by effecting a non-Pareto superior move.
Generally, except for a few cases involving special circumstances not
relevant to this discussion, 97 no serious challenge to the right to redeem
callable preferred stock is made. The reason courts are not prepared to
prevent such redemptions as inconsistent with the common law fiduciary
For a description of the economics of call provisions generally, see JAMES
C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 573-75 (9th ed. 1992)
(describing the impact and pricing of call provisions in debt instruments).
9' In Delaware ex rel. Waldmanv. Miller-Wohl Co., 28 A.2d 148, 152 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1942), for example, the court rescinded a redemption that it apparently
believed was intended only for the purpose of ridding the company of a preferred
stockholder who had made certain demands for inspection of corporate books and
records. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1947), involved
the exercise of a redemption right without the disclosure of material information
that would have led preferred stockholders to exercise their conversion rights
instead of taking the cash offered pursuant to the redemption provisions.
96
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duties of managers is because the preferred stockholders contracted for and
were paid to take the risk of the redemption. In Pareto terms, therefore, courts
can assume that the parties to the contract (i.e., the preferred stockholders, on
the one hand, and the corporation or the common stockholders, on the other
hand) made an ex ante Pareto superior move by agreeing at the time the
preferred shares were sold to the redemption provision. The consent by the
parties to that trade (i.e., the voluntariness of the agreement regarding the
terms of redemption) demonstrates that both parties to the transaction
considered themselves at the time of the sale better off as a result of the trade,
and no third party effects are apparent as a result of the transaction. Courts
enforce the contract and the subsequent move by managers in calling the
preferred stock, therefore, as a way to ensure that such e ante Pareto
superior moves by parties are possible.
Managers of corporations undertake a myriad of other moves that,
considered alone, seem to permit them to expropriate at least some portion of
the value of one group of stockholders for the benefit of another group of
stockholders. Another example of such a move by managers is found in the
old dividend credit cases98 in which preferred stockholders claimed that the
failure by corporate managers to pay non-cumulative preferred dividends
violated the fiduciary duties they were owed.99 Other examples of such cases
9s Examples of cases involving the application of the dividend credit analysis
include Sanders v. Cuba R.R. Co., 120 A.2d 849, 853 (N.J. 1956); Agnew v.
American Ice Co., 61 A.2d 154, 157 (N.J. Ch. 1948); Moran v. United States
Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 123 A. 546, 547 (N.J. Ch. 1924), aff'd by an
equally divided court 126 A. 329 (N.J. 1924). Other courts rejectedthe dividend
credit rule. See Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197 (1930); Guttmann v.
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 189 F.2d, 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,342 U.S.
867 (1952).
For a period of time, this matter attracted attention in the legal literature.
See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Non-CumulativePreferredStock, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 358
(1923); Alexander H. Frey, The Distributionof CorporateDividends, 89 U. PA.
L. REV. 735 (1941); Norman D. Lattin, Is Non-Cumulative PreferredStock in
Fact Preferred?,25 ILL. L. REv. 148 (1930); Note, Dividend Rights of NonCumulative PreferredStock, 61 YALE L.J. 245 (1952); Note, Right of NonCumulative PreferredStockholdersto BackDividendsEarnedBut Unpaid,74 U.
PA. L. REV. 605 (1926).
99 The discussions of the courts in these cases did not always focus on
fiduciary duties as a limit on the refusal to pay non-cumulative preferred
dividends. Since, however, the preferred stockholders' contract omitted any term
regarding a right to any past, unpaid dividends, the claim of the preferreds to
arrearages necessarily invoked other bases, and some non-contractual, overarching fiduciary duty was inevitably the heart of the matter.
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include managers' decisions to pay dividends on common stock,'00 repurchase common stock,10' or defer the paying off of arrearage on preferred
stock."0 2 Even such managers' decisions as making an unusually risky
investment"0 3 or adding significantly to the company's debt"° can effect
a wealth transfer between or among certain stockholders.
Paying dividends on common stock may reduce the value of the preferred
stock by reducing the pool of assets available to meet the obligations owed to
preferred stockholders.
01 Preferred stockholders can be harmed by repurchases of common stock,
since the outflow of corporate assets may increase the risk that the company will
be unable to meet its obligations to such preferred stockholders.
102 Preferred stockholders whose dividends are in arrears will benefit by the
rapid or immediate elimination of the arrearage. Any delay in elimination of the
arrearage, therefore, is contrary to the best interests of preferred stockholders.
03 Commentators have pointed out that fixed investors, such as preferred
stockholders, and residual investors, who are the common stockholders, may have
different investment objectives. Thus, even if a particular investment maximizes
the value of the corporation, it may nonetheless reduce the wealth of fixed
investors, who have no right to participate in earnings above their fixed,
contractual amount. See, e.g., Hurst & McGuinnis, supra note 6, at 195.
,' A significant body of literature discusses the expropriation of creditor
wealth that occurred in the highly leveraged transactions prevalent in the 1980s.
10

See, e.g., Benard Black & Joseph A. Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from
Takeovers and RestructuringBetween 1981 and 1986: $162 Billion is a Lot of
Money, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable
Coalitions: CorporateGovernanceas a Multi-PlayerGame, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495

(1990); Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 6; Gregg A. Jarrell et. al, The Market
for Corporate Control: The EmpiricalEvidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON PERSP.
49 (1988) (citing studies regarding shareholder gains in takeovers); Marcel Kahn
& Michael Klauser, AntitakeoverProvisionsin Bonds: BondholderProtectionor
Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1993); McDaniel,
Bondholders and Stockholders, supra note 6, at 206 (referring to the losses of

bondholders as "possibly the largest expropriation of investors in American
business history"); McDaniel, StockholdersandStakeholders,supranote 28. This

problem did not escape the notice of the popular press as well. See, e.g., Anise
C. Wallace, 11T Unit Sues Campeau Over Losses on Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

30, 1988, at D5.
The same principles of expropriation apply with respect to the investment
of preferred stockholders. Specifically, the addition by a company of large
amounts of debt can adversely affect the value of the preferred stockholders'
investment by making the company's ability to live up to its obligations to
preferred stockholders more uncertain.
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An explanation for the permissibility of all of these moves by
managers, each of which appears, at least to some extent, to make losers
of some stockholders and thus not be a Pareto superior move, is the same
as the explanation offered regarding the redemption of preferred stock.
In all these instances courts can conclude that the parties made an ex ante
Pareto superior move in striking the original bargain and that, therefore,
the courts' enforcement of the bargain is essential to protect the Pareto
superior trade.
2. The Obligation to Share Gains
Pareto criteria provide no rules for the sharing of any gains that may
be generated by corporate transactions. Accordingly, a Pareto superior
move is not made otherwise by the fact that one of the parties in the
relevant universe is able to garner most or even all of the gain from the
move. For example, return to Figures A and B and the accompanying
discussion in Part I of this Article. 5 The fact that all of the value
created by the purchase of the profitable machine, represented in
Figure B by the area between circles V' and V2 , is captured by the
common stockholders does not render the purchase a non-Pareto superior
move.
Consistent with this, courts in most instances do not require
managers, as a part of their fiduciary duties, to allocate gains among
stockholders pursuant to any prescribed pattern. 6 Instead, the limit of
managers' duties is set by the obligation to pursue Pareto superior states
for stockholders as a group. Referring again to Figures A and B and the
discussion in Part I, therefore, managers' fiduciary duties do not require
that they carve out and render to preferred stockholders any part of the
gain from the purchase of the profitable machine.
To a significant degree, the failure by courts to prescribe any pattern
of gain allocation may be driven by the same idea expressed in the

105

See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.

"oEven in more significant transactions, cases often indicate no obligation to share gains. See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107,
114 (Del. 1952) ("[U]pon a merger the minority stockholder shall receive the
substantial equivalent in value of what he had before."). Judge Easterbrook and
Professor Fischel have offered economic justifications for an unequal apportionment of gains in the context of acquisitions. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 83, at 708-11. Not surprisingly, Professors Brudney and Chirelstein,
express a contrary view. Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares, supra note 88, at
297.
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immediately preceding section.107 Accordingly, preferred stockholders
in Figures A and B, by electing not to be the residual beneficiaries,
consented to the allocation of most or all of such gains to common
stockholders. In such circumstances, courts may be content that the
preferred and common stockholders contracted ex ante for the allocation
of gains, a contract that was itself a Pareto superior move by the parties.
By staying out of the matter and permitting the contract to govern,
therefore, courts further a Pareto superior outcome.
Occasionally, however, courts have ventured into the area of gain
allocation as a part of their monitoring of corporate fiduciary duties. Two
examples of such cases are Levin v. Great Western Sugar Co.° 8 and
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. °9 Although Levin proceeded under a
state law intrinsic fairness test," while Mills involved a claimed
violation of the federal proxy antifraud provision contained in Rule 14a9,"1 both cases involved claims by minority common stockholders that
they were treated unfairly when the majority stockholders grabbed all the
gains generated in an affiliated merger." 2 The courts in both cases held
that the majority stockholder must share with minority stockholders the
gains generated in the transactions."'
Obviously, the outcomes in cases such as Levin and Mills, which
require apportionment of gains between or among various stockholders,
are not dictated by the obligation of managers to pursue Pareto efficiency.
Further, these outcomes are inconsistent with the more usual outcomes in
107

See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text. Another, perhaps more

cynical, reason one may find for the general absence in the common law of an
allocation of gain obligation is the difficulty and ubiquity of the problems created
by any mandatory allocation requirement. See Campbell, CorporateFiduciary
Principles,supra note 3.
10 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969).
109 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). Regarding
the obligation to share gains, the Mills court cited the work of Professors
Brudney and Chirelstein, specifically Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares,supra
note 88. For criticisms of Brudney and Chirelstein's ideas on the obligation to
share gains, see Jan G. Deutsch, The Mysteries of CorporateLaw: A Response
to Brudney and Chirelstein, 88 YALE L.J. 235 (1978); Simon M. Lome, A
Reappraisalof Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 956
(1978).
110 406 F.2d at 1114.
" 552 F.2d at 1240.
112
113

406 F.2d at 1114; 552 F.2d at 1240.
406 F.2d at 1120; 552 F.2d at 1250.
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which courts prescribe no special rules of apportionment of gain.
Unfortunately, neither Levin nor Mills articulate any principled reason
situations, fiduciary duties require
why in those cases, as opposed to other
14
a particular pattern of gain sharing.'
3.

The Limited Universe

This Article defines the obligations of corporate managers to pursue
Pareto superior moves within a universe limited to corporate stockholders.
This somewhat esoteric statement of the obligations of corporate
managers is more understandable and more usually stated in terms of the
rule that corporate managers owe no fiduciary duties to corporate
16
constituencies "' or interests other than stockholders.'

14

The author has written normatively on the question of whether or not

managers should be left unfettered in the allocation of gains. See Campbell,
CorporateFiduciaryPrinciples,supra note 3.
'I The term "corporate constituencies" is applied to various groups of
entities that have some relationship with or investment in the corporation. The
constituencies that have attracted the most attention in recent years include the
following: corporate creditors, see, e.g., infra note 122, employees, see, e.g.,
Maureen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a FiduciaryDuty to ProtectDisplaced Workers, 69 N.C.L. REv.
1189 (1991); Katherine V. Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under State
NonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45, 48-53 (1991),
suppliers and the community in which the corporation (or a part of the
corporation) is located, see Campbell, CorporateFiduciaryPrinciples,supranote
3.
116 This, of course, is a longstanding, well-established rule of corporate law
that probably has been discussed most often with regard to whether creditors are
owed any fiduciary duty or are able to enforce fiduciary duties derivatively. See,
e.g., HENRY W. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 184 (rev. ed. 1946) ("Creditors
have no direct right of action against directors or officers for mismanagement
...by the better view."); see also the following cases, which are consistent:
Nuclear Corp. v. Hale, 355 F. Supp. 193, 198 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 479 F.2d 1045
(5th Cir. 1973) ("If officers of a corporation act in good faith and with
prudence and diligence they are not personally liable to creditors for the
corporation's insolvency absent fraud or some provision of positive law.");
Skinner v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769, 773 (Fla. 1931) ("Directors are not liable to the
creditors on the theory of being fiduciaries."); Conrick v. Houston Civic Opera
Ass'n, 99 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. 1936) ("Directors are not personally liable to
creditors for mismanagement, or for waste of assets except upon proof of the
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Often, corporate managers' wealth-maximizing moves on behalf of
a stockholder-only universe are at the expense of other corporate
constituencies, although the vast majority of such moves raise no
significant objections or even attract any attention. For example, a
decision by managers to switch from Supplier A, who is able to supply
superior quality widgets for $10, to Supplier B, who is able to supply
superior quality widgets for $5, increases the wealth of the stockholders
at the expense, at least to some extent, one might argue, of Supplier A,
its owners and employees. No one seems to question, however, the
propriety of the obligation of corporate managers to switch to the more
efficient supplier of widgets, even though the move creates losers in
Supplier A and its constituencies.
Notwithstanding that courts over the years usually have limited the
scope of fiduciary duties to the protection of stockholders or, in the terms
of this Article, applied the Pareto superior obligation to a stockholderonly universe, courts have occasionally in compelling circumstances
expanded the universe protected by the fiduciary obligations beyond that
of stockholders." 7 Generally, however, such cases are isolated and

commission of actual fraud." (quoting 2 THOMPSON ON CORPORATIONS 980 (3d
ed. 1927))); Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Inland Printing Co., 484
P.2d 162, 163 (Utah 1971) (holding that directors are not personally liable to
the corporation's creditors for "mere mismanagement or waste of assets.");
Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501, 508 (Va. 1933) ("[N]o direct action lies to a
creditor of a corporation against its directors ...for improper performance
or failure in performance of their duties." (quoting Saunders v. Bank, 664
S.E. 94 (1912))); Wheeling Kitchen Equip. Co. v. R. & R. Sewing Center, Inc.,
179 S.E.2d 587, 590 (W. Va. 1971) ("[D]irectors and officers are not liable
for the debts of the corporation in the absence of wrongdoing."); Inter-Ocean
Casualty Co. v. Lecony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51, 53-54 (W. Va.
1941) ("Creditors... cannot maintain an action at law against the directors
...for simple nonfeasance of duty to the corporation or fraud in its management ...in the absence of an active intent to deceive or defraud the plaintiff.").
Derivative remedies are also generally unavailable for creditors for any
breach of fiduciary duties by managers. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 7.41(1) (1994); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.02
(American Law Institute 1994).
..E.g.. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216, 224 (D.S.C. 1971)
(holding that a dominant shareholder owed a fiduciary duty to debenture holders
not to sell the corporation to a looter), rev'd,480 F.2d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 1973)
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aberrational." 8
(reversing the district court because the facts were insufficient to show that the
dominant shareholder should have been suspicious of the purchaser); see also,
e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (holding that a dominant
shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to creditors when dealing with the corporation
and the burden is on the dominant shareholder to prove good faith and inherent
fairness of the transaction from the point of view of the corporation); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying North
Carolina law to find that "where a creditor ...has sustained an identifiable loss
peculiar and personal to himself by reason of the fraud or negligent mismanagement of the corporation's business by its directors, he has a cause of action
against the directors .... ."); W. H. Elliot & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d
544, 547 (1st Cir. 1962) (holding that a transfer by a debtor corporation to a
"newly organized corporation, thinly financed with $1,000 capital and 40% of
whose common stock was owned by [the debtor's officers]" could involve a
fiduciary duty violation by that officer); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
131, 205 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that a majority shareholder in local operation
companies to be divested under proposed antitrust consent decree "has the
fiduciary duty to protect all those with interests in these companies, including
creditors."), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983); Stemberg v. Blaine, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ark. 1929) ("[T]he director
whose negligence causes loss is liable for such losses to stockholders and
creditors."); WestemProducers Co-Operativev. Great WesternUnited Corp., 613
P.2d 873, 878 (Colo. 1980) (holding that a contract requiring the directors to use
their "best efforts" to gain approval of the debenture holders for recapitalization
did not give the directors authority to violate their legal duties of "fidelity,
good faith, and prudence with respect to the interests [of the debenture
holders]"); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824-25 (N.J. 1981)
(finding a corporate director personally liable in negligence for failure to
prevent misappropriation of trust funds by other directors who were also
officers and directors of the corporation); Underwood v. Stafford, 155 S.E.2d
211, 212 (N.C. 1967) (holding that under the North Carolina "trust fund
doctrine," "the officers and directors occupy fiduciary position in respect to
stockholders and creditors, which charges them with the presentation and proper
distribution of those assets."); Anthony v. Jeffress, 90 S.E. 414, 415 (N.C. 1916)
(holding director liable to creditors for damages due to "negligence, fraud or
deceit.").
18

McDaniel, however, opines that "California courts recognize ... a

fiduciary duty to bondholders." McDaniel, Bondholdersand Stockholders,supra
note 6, at 275.
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More recently, the spate of highly leveraged acquisitions of the 1980s
generated a number of cases, some of which confused the universe with
respect to which the fiduciary duties of corporate managers are defined.
In one case growing out of these acquisitions, Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.," 9 the bondholders mounted a
nearly direct attack of the concept of the limited universe. The bondholders of RJR Nabisco claimed that as a result of the acquisition of RJR
Nabisco the value of their bonds was "drastically impaired,... in effect,
misappropriating the value of those bonds" for the benefit of stockholders, who, the plaintiffs claimed, received an "enormous windfall."'20
The RJR Nabisco court, however, easily denied the claims of the
bondholders, in part based on its conclusion that no fiduciary duty was
owed to creditors.'
The outcome in the RJR Nabisco case is not surprising, since it is
consistent with the obligation of corporate managers to pursue Pareto
superior states on behalf of the stockholder-only universe. The highly
leveraged transaction in RJR Nabisco apparently increased the total value
of the stockholder-only universe and created no losers within that
universe, and, therefore, the transaction was a Pareto superior move
within the relevant universe. Losers were created, but those losers were
bondholders, who, of course, are not part of the relevant universe.'
In fact, the consistent application of the Pareto criteria to the
stockholder-only universe means not only that managers of RJR Nabisco
were permitted to engage in this wealth-transferring transaction, but also
that they were required to do so. Failure to increase the stockholders'
wealth through expropriation would have been a violation of the
managers' fiduciary duty to the same extent as would be a failure to
switch to the more efficient supplier of widgets in the prior example. The
outcome in RJR Nabisco, therefore, is entirely appropriate in the sense

119
716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
120 Id. at 1506.
121 Id. at 1524.
122 A number of commentators have considered the question of whether
creditors, like stockholders, deserve the protection of fiduciary duties. Albert H.
Barkey, The FinancialArticulation of a FiduciaryDuty to Bondholders with
FiduciaryDuties to Stockholdersof the Corporation,20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47
(1986); William W. Bratton, Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships:Legal Theory in
a Time of Restructuring,1989 DuKE L.J. 92; Hurst & McGuinness, supra note
6; McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 413;
McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders,supra note 6; Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The FairnessRights of CorporateBondholders,65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1990).

HeinOnline -- 84 Ky. L.J. 502 1995-1996

1995-96]

CORPORATE FIDUCIARY

DUTIES

that it is consistent with the Pareto obligations of RJR Nabisco's
managers.
In theoretically closely related cases, however, the responses of courts
have been more equivocal regarding the obligation of corporate managers
to promote only the interests of stockholders." In these cases, target
managers were sued by their stockholders as a result of defensive tactics
employed by the managers in response to hostile takeovers. Managers
then defended their tactics by claiming that their actions benefited other,
non-stockholder constituencies, such as creditors or employees, and that,
as a result, such defensive tactics were appropriate. Disgruntled stockholders, however, claimed that the particular tactics did not maximize
stockholder wealth and thus violated the fiduciary obligations owed to
them.
The disposition of these issues should have been as easy for courts
as those generated in the more direct attacks in cases such as RJR
Nabisco. Strangely, however, courts had more trouble here. In Revlon, for
example, when the board of the target attempted to defend a particular
defensive tactic on the grounds that the move helped stabilize the price
of certain of the target's publicly held debt instruments, the court
equivocally and confusingly answered that managers may have regard for
various constituencies in discharging their responsibilities, provided there
are "rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."" 4 Later,
in Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.," 5 the Time board
attempted to legitimize its actions in that heated takeover contest by, inter
alia, the need to protect Time's "culture," which clearly incorporated the
interests of constituencies other than the Time stockholders." 6 While
not mentioning the "Time culture" specifically, the Delaware court added
to the confusion created in Revlon by concluding that target boards, such
as Time's, when dealing with takeovers can consider "the impact [of such
27
takeovers] on 'constituencies' other than shareholders ....
The courts in both Revlon and Paramount Communications Inc. v.
Time Inc. head down the same wrong track. The simple answer in both
See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1985); Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1989).
24 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176
(Del. 1985).
1' 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
126 Id. at 1152. Time's "culture" consisted of "its perceived editorial integrity
3

in journalism." Id.
27 Id. at 1153.

HeinOnline -- 84 Ky. L.J. 503 1995-1996

504

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 84

of those cases is that the creditors and the "Time culture" count for
nothing in the analysis. In light of the long-standing, relevant universe for
judging the appropriateness of corporate managers, concern for neither
creditors nor the "Time culture" can justify any defensive tactics, and
such defensive tactics by corporate managers are absolutely prohibited if
they do not lead to the maximization of stockholder wealth.
The confusion generated by this language from Revlon and Paramount CommunicationsInc. v. Time Inc. is interesting, however, since it
likely indicates moral uneasiness with actions by corporate managers that
create losses in other constituencies. Courts may be starting to understand
that stockholder wealth maximization can at times be totally or partially
based on expropriation from other constituencies that, in the minds of
some at least, 28 deserve protection. Courts may, therefore, be starting
to rethink the matter of whether a moral justification exists for limiting
the application of the Pareto universe to only stockholders.
If this is the case, however, and accordingly courts no longer have the
stomach for a continuing limitation on the relevant universe, such a move
by courts to expand the relevant universe beyond stockholders involves
a major policy shift away from the longstanding, contrary rule. To state
the obvious, such a dramatic change in the common law should be
articulated in clear language by any court. The shoddy judicial language
on this matter in Revlon and Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time
Inc. is insufficient. While one may or may not agree in a normative sense
with the outcome in RJR Nabisco, the case, at least, is clear and
consistent with the obligation of managers to pursue Pareto superiority
only on behalf of corporate stockholders.
CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to explain the fiduciary duties of corporate
managers in terms of an obligation by managers to make all possible
Pareto superior moves on behalf of stockholders. Courts, of course,
recognize the near impossibility of applying Pareto criteria in their
pristine form and thus accept certain practical concessions, such as the
stockholder-only universe and the use of financial, instead of economic,
costs. So modified, however, courts, when dealing with fiduciary duty
claims, again and again return to the essential concepts of obligations to
maximize wealth and refrain from wealth transfers, concepts which are
the essence of the obligation to pursue Pareto superior states.

,28 See supra note 122.
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The Article is intended as a positive analysis, although the Article at
times generates something of a prescriptive flavor, as applications of
Pareto criteria point toward certain solutions for unresolved or confusing
fiduciary duty problems. Thus, for example, the analysis suggests that the
obligation of corporate managers to pursue Pareto superior moves on
behalf of stockholders may lead courts to declare that lock-ups are per se
illegal, that the business purpose doctrine should be scrapped as
superfluous, and that the Revlon duties are superfluous in their affirmative
form and wrong in their negative form.
The positive analysis of this Article also, hopefully, explains the
broad appeal of Pareto criteria. Understandably, courts are attracted to
solutions that generate wealth for society without creating individual
losers.
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